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Photometric constraints for the perception of transparency were investigated using stereoscopic textured displays. A contrast discon-
tinuity divided the textured displays into two lateral halves, with one (reference) half ﬁxed. Observers adjusted the luminance range with-
in the other (test) half in order to perform two tasks: (i) indicate the highest luminance range for which the test side is perceived to be
transparent, and (ii) indicate the lowest luminance range for which the test side is seen as being in plain view. Settings were obtained for
multiple values of test mean luminance, in order to map out the perceptual locus of transition between transparency and non-transpar-
ency. The results revealed a systematic violation of Metellis magnitude constraint in predicting the percept of transparency. Observer
settings were approximated instead by a constraint based on perceived contrast (which matched Michelson contrast for the textures
used). The results also revealed large asymmetries between darkening and lightening transparency. When the test was darker than the
reference, settings were highly consistent across observers and closely followed the Michelson-contrast prediction. When the test was
lighter, however, there was greater variability across observers, with two observers exhibiting shifts toward Metellis magnitude con-
straint. Moreover, each observers setting reliability was signiﬁcantly worse for lightening transparency than darkening transparency.
These results suggest that (polarity-preserving) darkening serves as an additional cue to perceptual transparency.
 2005 Elsevier Ltd. All rights reserved.
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In the course of image projection, contributions of mul-
tiple scene variables are collapsed onto the rendered image.
Any estimation of scene structure, therefore, must involve
disentangling (whether explicitly or implicitly) the contri-
butions of diﬀerent scene variables. Computing 3D shape
from image shading, for example, requires that the pattern
of image intensity be analyzed in terms of the respective
contributions of illumination, surface reﬂectance, and local
surface orientation.
A particularly compelling case of image decomposition
occurs in perceptual transparency. An example is shown
in Fig. 1A, where the uniformly colored image region P
is seen as containing two surfaces layered in depth—a black0042-6989/$ - see front matter  2005 Elsevier Ltd. All rights reserved.
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E-mail address: manish@ruccs.rutgers.edu (M. Singh).surface in the background and a mid-gray partially trans-
missive surface in front. Similarly, region Q is seen as con-
taining a light-colored surface seen through a transparent
mid-gray surface. The perceptual vividness of this decom-
position underscores the fact that, unlike other forms of
image decomposition, the perception of transparency
involves a decomposition into two distinct surfaces or
material layers—rather than, say, a surface and a pattern
of shading.
A basic question concerning perceptual transparency is
how the visual system is able to compute a representation
of two surfaces along the same line of sight—one seen
through the other—from a 2D array that varies along a sin-
gle dimension, namely, image intensity. In articulating the
constraints used to initiate the decomposition of image
intensity into two distinct surfaces, researchers have
consistently pointed to two classes of image properties:
photometric properties, involving relative intensity values






Fig. 1. (A) An example of perceptual transparency. The uniformly colored
image region labeled P is perceived as containing two distinct surfaces: a
black surface seen through a mid-gray transparent layer. Similarly, region
Q is seen as a light-colored surface seen through transparency. (B)
Metellis episcotister model of transparency.
1 Moreover, these equations apply equally if a veil or mesh is used
instead of an episcotister—i.e., a surface with a large number of holes
that are too small to be resolved individually. In this case, the color
mixing takes place spatially, rather than temporally, with a corresponding
to the areal density of the holes (Richards & Stevens, 1979).
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iens, Troost, & de Weert, 1990; Kasrai & Kingdom,
2001; Masin, 1997; Metelli, 1974; Metelli, Da Pos, & Cave-
don, 1985; Robilotto, Khang, & Zaidi, 2002; Singh, 2004;
Singh & Anderson, 2002), and geometric properties, involv-
ing spatial and conﬁgural factors (Adelson, 2000; Ander-
son, 1997; Beck & Ivry, 1988; Kanizsa, 1979; Kasrai &
Kingdom, 2002; Metelli, 1974; Singh & Hoﬀman, 1998).
In the current study, we investigate the role of photometric
properties in initiating the perceptual decomposition that
accompanies the percept of transparency, given a ﬁxed
geometric context.
1.1. Generative models
Metelli proposed a well-known model of transparency
(Metelli, 1970, 1974, 1985; Metelli et al., 1985) using Tal-
bots equations of color mixing: The achromatic colors
of a partially transmissive (transparent) surface and an
underlying (opaque) surface are mixed—with the mixing
proportions determined by the transmittance of the trans-
parent surface (i.e., the proportion of incident light it trans-
mits). Metelli modeled the transparent surface as a rotating
episcotister—an opaque disk with an open sector (similar
to a rotating fan, but with a single wide blade; see
Fig. 1B). With suﬃciently rapid rotations, the episcotister
appears as a homogeneous partially transmissive surface
(as in Fig. 1A)—its transmittance given by the relative size
of the open sector.
Thus, if a and b are the reﬂectances of two underlying
surface regions, t is the reﬂectance of the episcotister
surface, and a is the relative size of its open sector, then
the resulting color mixing is described by Talbots
equations:
p ¼ aaþ ð1 aÞt; ð1Þ
q ¼ abþ ð1 aÞt. ð2Þ
Since a and t are by construction identical—being the
transmittance and reﬂectance of the same, homogeneous,
transparent layer—the two equations are easily solved for
a and t:a ¼ p  q
a b ; ð3Þ
t ¼ aq bp
aþ q b p . ð4Þ
Although Metelli expressed his equations in terms of reﬂec-
tance values, Gerbino et al. (1990) have shown that the
same equations also follow in the luminance domain, under
the assumption that the transparent layer and the back-
ground surface are illuminated equally.1 Equations in
terms of luminance values are more natural for perceptual
theory since luminance values, not reﬂectances, constitute
inputs to the visual system. Henceforth, we will assume
the luminance formulation of Metellis equations, i.e., we
will treat a, b, p, q as luminance values.
Despite the simplicity of Metellis equations, they have
been shown to provide reasonable approximations to
physical models of ﬁlters—which involve multiple reﬂec-
tions within the ﬁlter as well as between the ﬁlter and
the background (Beck et al., 1984; Gerbino, 1994; Faul
& Ekroll, 2002; Nakauchi, Silfsten, Parkkinen, & Ussui,
1999; Robilotto et al., 2002). The equations for the ﬁlter
model converge to Eq. (5), as the illuminant strength gets
increasingly higher (see Gerbino, 1994). Similarly, the fog
model approximates the Metelli Eq. (4) under the
assumption that the fog extinction coeﬃcient is constant
across wavelength (Hagedorn & DZmura, 2000)—a rea-
sonable assumption for naturally occuring clouds and
fog (McClatchey, Fenn, Selby, Volz, & Garing, 1978).
Metellis equations have also been extended to the chro-
matic domain, to deﬁne a convergene model of color
transparency (DZmura, Colantoni, Knoblauch, & Laget,
1997).
1.2. Qualitative constraints for transparency
Based on solution (2) for a, Metelli derived two ‘‘quali-
tative constraints’’ for predicting the percept of transparen-
cy in the regions P and Q in his four-color displays
(Metelli, 1970, 1974, 1985; Metelli et al., 1985). First, since
a cannot be negative, the diﬀerence p  q must have the
same sign as a  b; so that, if region A is darker than B,
then region P must be darker than Q. In other words,
the P/Q border must have the same contrast polarity as
the A/B border (the polarity constraint). Second, since a
cannot exceed 1 (being the proportion of light transmitted),
the magnitude of the diﬀerence p  q must not exceed that
of a  b (the magnitude constraint).
• C1. Polarity constraint: sign (p  q) = sign (a  b).
• C2. Magnitude constraint: jp  qj 6 ja  bj.
A B C
Fig. 2. Junction classiﬁcation and transparency. (A) Contrast polarity is preserved across both horizontal and vertical contours; this display exhibits
bistable depth layering. (B) Polarity is preserved across the horizontal, but not the vertical contours; this display exhibits a unique depth layering. (C)
Polarity reverses across both sets of contours; this display is not perceived as containing a transparent overlap.
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ency has been uncontroversial. Indeed, contrast polarity has
been shown to provide a powerful constraint on image inter-
pretation, and been used to devise striking illusions of light-
ness and transparency (e.g. Adelson, 1993, 2000; Anderson,
1997, 1999;Anderson&Winawer, 2005). Simple schemes for
the classiﬁcation of X-junctions, based on the polarity rela-
tionships across two intersecting edges, go a long way in pre-
dicting percepts of transparency and ordinal depth
relationships between distinct layers (Adelson & Anandan,
1990; Beck & Ivry, 1988).2 In Fig. 2, for instance, changing
the common color of the four cellsL2,L4,N2, andN4 chang-
es the polarity relations at the X-junctions—thereby altering
the percept of transparency. The display in A exhibits bista-
ble transparency (either columns L and N, or rows 2 and 4,
can be seen as transparent and in front), the display in B
exhibits a unique transparency interpretation (only rows 2
and 4 can be seen as transparent), whereas the display in C
is not perceived as containing a transparent overlap.
Although contrast-polarity relations at junctions can
predict which contours—e.g., the vertical or horizontal
contours in Fig. 2—will be perceived as boundaries of a
transparent layer, they do not specify which side of a con-
tour will be perceived as transparent. In Figs. 2A and B, for
instance, the polarity relations do not in themselves explain
why rows 2 and 4—but not rows 1 and 3—are seen as
transparent. As this example makes it clear, a basic prob-
lem in the computation of transparency is determining
which image regions correspond to surface patches seen
in plain view, i.e., without any overlying transparency. A
useful way to articulate the problem of transparency is thus
in terms of an anchoring framework (Anderson, 1999,
2003), where the anchoring is performed on the dimension2 Polarity constraints at X-junctions provide strong, albeit entirely local,
constraints on image interpretation. Computing and segmenting a
transparent layer requires, in addition, that these local constraints be
propagated and integrated along the bounding contour of a candidate
transparent layer in order to check for mutual consistency (see Singh &
Huang, 2003 for an implementation of such an integration scheme for the
automatic segregation of transparent layers).of transmittance or opacity (rather than lightness, e.g. Gil-
christ et al., 1999). According to the transmittance-anchor-
ing principle, the visual system anchors regions of highest
contrast in an image to full transmittance (i.e., a = 1),
and decomposes regions of lower contrast into multiple
layers. This principle thus predicts that the same image
region may be perceived either as containing a transparent
overlay, or as seen in plain view, depending on the con-
trasts of adjacent regions. Recent work also shows that
transmittance anchoring has both a spatial and a temporal
component, such that the visual system anchors the highest
contrast within a spatio-temporal sequence to full transmit-
tance (Anderson, Singh, & Meng, 2005).
The anchoring principle provides an elegant framework
for inferring percepts of transparency and depth layering.
However it does not settle the issue of what the appropriate
measure of contrastmagnitude is for the computation of per-
ceptual transparency. Indeed, the issue of competing con-
trast measures does not arise in the context where the
anchoring rule was originally articulated, i.e., transparency
displays containing T-junctions (see Anderson, 1997,
1999). The various measures of contrast magnitude in this
case all make the same prediction concerning which side
has ‘‘lower contrast.’’ As we will see below, this is not true
in general.
As noted above, Metelli (1974) originally articulated his
magnitude constraint in terms of reﬂectance diﬀerences: the
magnitude of p  q must be no greater than that of a  b.
Since then, the notion of contrast magnitude relevant for
transparency has been variously deﬁned by researchers in
terms of lightness diﬀerences (Beck et al., 1984), luminance
diﬀerences (Gerbino et al., 1990), Michelson contrast
(Singh & Anderson, 2002), and perceived contrast (Robil-
otto et al., 2002). Indeed, there is currently no general con-
sensus on what the appropriate notion of contrast
magnitude is for initiating percepts of transparency.33 This situation is further complicated by the fact that there is no known
contrast measure that can universally capture apparent contrast—in both
simple and complex textures.
4 Indeed, one need only note that the numerator in the solution for t can
be re-written as: aq bp ¼ 12 ðaþ bÞðp þ qÞ½abaþb  pqpþq, and that (a + b) and
(p + q) cannot be negative.
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based on experiments involving the matching of material
properties of transparent layers, not on whether a layered
surface structure involving transparency is perceived.) In
the reported experiments, we map out the space of mean
luminance and luminance range values that generate a per-
cept of transparency, and compare these with observers
contrast matches, in order to better understand the photo-
metric properties that the visual system uses in initiating a
layered decomposition in transparency.
2. Assessing the validity of the magnitude constraint
Two considerations call into question the validity of
Metellis magnitude constraint C2. First, Metellis deriva-
tion of this constraint was based on solution (3) for a (in
particular, on the restriction a 6 1). As a result, the percep-
tual validity of this constraint depends critically on that of
solution (3). In recent work, however, we have demonstrat-
ed that Metellis solution fails to predict perceived trans-
mittance (Singh & Anderson, 2002). Given ﬁxed
background luminances (e.g., a and b in Metellis four-
color displays), Metellis solution predicts that perceived
transmittance should be independent of the mean lumi-
nance within the region of transparency—depending only
on the luminance diﬀerence or range (p  q) therein. Con-
trary to this prediction, we found a systematic dependence
of perceived transmittance on both luminance range and
mean luminance within the region of transparency. For
the textured backgrounds used in our study (sinusoidal
gratings), this dependence was found to be captured by
the Michelson contrast LmaxLminLmaxþLmin within the region of trans-
parency. As a result, lightening ﬁlters appear more opaque
than they should according to Metellis a (i.e., when mean
luminance in transparency region > mean luminance in
background region), whereas darkening ﬁlters appear more
transmissive than they should. A failure of Metellis a was
also found in Robilotto et al.s (2002) study (see also Robil-
otto & Zaidi, 2004). However, all standard measures of
contrast, including Michelson contrast, failed to predict
perceived transmittance in their displays containing com-
plex and variegated textures. Despite this, perceived trans-
mittance was shown to be consistent with observers
matches of apparent contrast—and hence inconsistent with
Metellis a.
The second consideration that calls into question the
validity of Metellis magnitude constraint is that it was
based entirely on a restriction on the solution for a. It
did not make use of the solution for t, even though t is
of course also restricted—in particular, t cannot be nega-
tive. However, Metelli and others (e.g., Beck et al., 1984)
have argued that no simple, perceptually meaningful, pre-
diction can be derived from restrictions on solution (4).
We have previously shown, however, that this is not true
(Singh & Anderson, 2002). Speciﬁcally, we demonstrated
using the luminance formulation of Metellis equations,
that the constraint tP 0 (along with the restriction thata 6 1) implies that the region of transparency must have
a lower Michelson contrast (i.e., pqpþq 6 abaþb).
4 Thus, some-
what paradoxically, while Metellis equations do not pre-
dict that perceived transmittance scales with Michelson
contrast, they do predict that the region of transparency
must have lower Michelson contrast relative to adjoining
image regions.
The two considerations above suggest a natural alterna-
tive to Metellis magnitude constraint, namely: in order for
an image region to decompose perceptually into two layers,
it must have lower Michelson contrast than adjoining
image regions.
• C3. Michelson-contrast constraint: j pqpþq j 6 j abaþb j.
For displays involving X-junctions, it is readily seen that
the magnitude constraint C2 and the Michelson-contrast
constraint C3 can make opposing predictions concerning
which image region should undergo a perceptual decompo-
sition into multiple layers. Speciﬁcally, if p, q, a, and b are
the four luminance values at a polarity-preserving X-
junction, it is straightforward to assign values such that
(p  q) 6 (a + b) but pqpþqP abaþb. (A simple example is pro-
vided by setting p = 12, q = 8, a = 48, b = 36.) In this case,
Metellis magnitude constraint predicts that the P/Q region
should be perceived as containing an overlying transparent
layer, whereas the Michelson-contrast constraint predicts
that the A/B region should decompose into two separate
layers.
Finally, based on the results of Robilotto et al.s (2002)
study, we consider an additional constraint, based on per-
ceived contrast:
• C4. Perceived-contrast constraint: pcont(p/q) < pcont(a/b),
where pcont is short for perceived contrast. In many
instances, constraint C4 will coincide with constraint C3;
however, as Robilotto et al.s study showed, this need not
always be the case—especially for complex textures.
According to the more general constraint C4, image
decomposition in perceptual transparency is determined
by a lowering in perceived contrast—independently of
how this might be deﬁned for a given texture.
In the current experiments, we investigate the photomet-
ric relations that generate a percept of transparency, and
compare these against the predictions based on luminance
range, Michelson contrast, and perceived contrast.
3. Experiments
The class of stimulus displays we use is shown in Fig. 3.
As in our previous experiments, we use stereoscopic dis-
plays with textured backgrounds—rather than a bipartite
Fig. 4. Schematic depiction of the depth stratiﬁcation of surfaces seen in
the stereoscopic displays in Fig. 3.
Fig. 3. Stereoscopic displays used in Experiment 1. The top and bottom displays contain the same binocular disparity, and diﬀer only in the contrast
within their left halves. However, their depth percepts are very diﬀerent: In the top display, the contrast border is seen as bounding a transparent layer on
the left, and its near depth propagates to the entire transparent surface on the left. In the bottom display, the near depth propagates to the entire
transparent surface on the right.
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and the assignment of surface attributes to these layers, is
more robust in such displays (e.g. Singh & Anderson,
2002). However, unlike our previous study, where we
employed displays with a center-surround conﬁguration,
here the contrast discontinuity runs vertically down the
midline, dividing the display into two lateral halves. This
conﬁguration is designed to ensure that the two textured
regions have a symmetric status, insofar as conﬁgural fac-
tors are concerned. Since our goal is to study the role of
photometric constraints in perceptual transparency, it is
important to minimize biases from other sources. With a
center-surround conﬁguration, for instance, there is a
potentially confounding ﬁgural bias, namely, the small
enclosed central disk is more likely to be perceived as
‘‘ﬁgure,’’ rather than ‘‘ground,’’ which may interact in
ill-understood ways with photometric constraints for
transparency.
Consider the two stereoscopic displays in Fig. 3. They
are identical as far as ﬁgural relations are concerned and,
moreover, they contain precisely the same disparity infor-
mation: First, the texture elements have been given far dis-
parity relative to the rectangular frame, so that a
frontoparallel textured plane appears to be viewed through
a large rectangular window. Second, the locus of contrast
discontinuity between the two halves has been given near
disparity relative to the texture elements, which places thisborder in a depth plane between the underlying textured
surface and the rectangular window. The resulting depth
stratiﬁcation is shown schematically in Fig. 4.
Fig. 5. Transparency as an instance of border ownership, or ﬁgure-ground
assignment. (A) The luminance discontinuity is perceived as bounding a
mid-gray surface of the left, with the light-gray surface perceived as
extending behind it. (B) The contrast discontinuity is perceived as
bounding a transparent layer on the right, with the striped background
surface extending behind it.
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mation places the vertical contrast discontinuity closer in
depth relative to the textured background, it does not dic-
tate which side of this boundary, if any, will be perceived as
containing a surface at that depth. In the top panel of
Fig. 3, the contrast discontinuity is perceived as being
‘‘owned’’ by a transparent surface that overlies the left half
of the display—with its near depth propagating across this
entire transparent surface. In the bottom panel, with pre-
cisely the same disparities and modifying only the contrast
of the left half, the near depth of the contrast discontinuity
now spreads to the entire right half of the display—or,
more precisely, to the transparent surface perceived to
overlie the right half of the display. This example demon-
strates that the perceptual construction of transparency is
naturally considered as an instance of ﬁgure-ground assign-
ment (or border ownership): Whereas in a standard ﬁgure-
ground display, a luminance discontinuity is perceived as
being owned by one side or another (Fig. 5A), here a con-
trast discontinuity may be owned by a transparent surface
on one side or the other (see Fig. 5B). Moreover, the
perceptual diﬀerence between the top and bottom panels
in Fig. 3 demonstrates that the percept of transparency
can be altered by modifying only the relative contrast mag-
nitudes—while preserving all conﬁgural and stereoscopicFig. 6. A sequence of displays in which the right half is ﬁxed, and the luminan
mean). The question addressed in Experiment 1 is: At what point along such a s
transparent to it being seen in plain view?information. This fact provides us with an appropriate
experimental handle on the investigation of photometric
constraints in perceptual transparency.
3.1. Plotting the prediction space
A natural way to conceive of the problem at hand is in
terms of the following question: If the luminance range
(i.e., amplitude, Lmax  Lmin) of the textured region in
the left half of the display is gradually increased (see
Fig. 6) symmetrically about its mean, at what point along
this spectrum does a switch in perceptual transparency
occur? In other words, at what point does the percept
switch from ‘‘left side is transparent’’ to ‘‘left side is seen
in plain view?’’ Referring to the right side in this display
as the reference side (which is ﬁxed), and the left side the
test side, this question can then be posed for diﬀerent val-
ues of mean luminance on the test side. The loci at which
a switch in the percept of transparency occurs—from the
test side appearing transparent to appearing as seen in
plain view—will naturally inform us about the photometric
constraints being used to initiate percepts of transparency.
In slightly more general form, the question is simply:
Given a reference side with ﬁxed mean luminance and lumi-
nance range, what combinations of mean luminance and
luminance range within the test side will generate a percept
of transparency therein? Since the textures in the two
halves of each display are generated using the same algo-
rithm—diﬀering only in mean luminance and luminance
range—each texture patch can be quantiﬁed uniquely by
its mean (L) and its range (R). The reference side has a
ﬁxed mean, L0, and luminance range, R0, and is thus repre-
sented by a ﬁxed point in (L,R)-space (see Fig. 7). Relative
to this reference point, we can now ask: What subset of the
(L,R)-space can the test side reside in, and appear
transparent?
Two very diﬀerent prediction subsets follow from Metel-
lis magnitude constraint C2 and the Michelson-contrast
constraint C3. The horizontal line passing through
(L0,R0) in Fig. 7A corresponds to the locus of points for
which the test side has the same luminance range as the ref-
erence side (i.e., R = R0). Thus, according to Metellis mag-
nitude constraint, the shaded region below this line is thece range within the left half is gradually increased (symmetrically about its
equence does a perceptual switch occur from the left side being perceived as
      
Fig. 7. Plotting the predictions of constraints C2 and C3 in initiating percepts of transparency. The reference side has ﬁxed mean luminance L0 and ﬁxed
luminance range R0. The test side can take any value in (L,R)-space. (A) Shows the subset of the (L,R)-space that is predicted to generate a percept of
transparency on the test side, according to Metellis magnitude constraint C2. (B) Shows the corresponding transparent subset predicted by the Michelson-
contrast constraint C3. Any other measure of contrast will similarly partition the (L, R) space into two.
M. Singh, B.L. Anderson / Vision Research 46 (2006) 879–894 885set of (L,R) values for which the test side should appear
transparent. On the other hand, the oblique line passing
through (L0,R0) and the origin in Fig. 7B is the locus of
points for which the test side has the same Michelson con-
trast as the reference side (since this line is deﬁned by
R
L ¼ R0L0). Thus, the Michelson-contrast constraint predicts
that the shaded region below this oblique line is the set
of (L,R) values for which the test side should appear
transparent.5
Our experiments test the perceptual validity of these pre-
dictions. When the test and reference have the same mean
luminance (L = L0), note that the predicted transition
point between ‘‘transparent’’ and ‘‘not transparent’’ is the
same under both hypotheses. Thus, the two hypotheses
can be experimentally distinguished only when the mean
luminance of the test side diﬀers suﬃciently from that of
the reference. Moreover, the case of equal mean luminanc-
es is also less interesting given that the contrast discontinu-
ity simply disappears when the two sides have roughly the
same contrast; whereas this is not the case when the mean
luminances are unequal (e.g., see the sequence in Fig. 6). In
Experiment 1, we measure the perceptual transition
between ‘‘transparent’’ and ‘‘not transparent’’ on the test
side, for multiple values of test mean luminance—both
darker and lighter than the reference. In Experiment 2,
we obtain observers contrast matches on the same tex-
tures, in order to compare the transparency results against
perceived contrast.
3.2. Experiment 1
To estimate the locus of switch in the percept of trans-
parency, we adopt the strategy of approaching it from both
directions. One of the two halves of the display—the refer-
ence—is ﬁxed (with mean luminance L0, and luminance
range R0). For diﬀerent values of mean luminance L on5 It should be noted that although we highlight two speciﬁc predictions
here (based on constraints C2 and C3), the framework is entirely general:
Any other conceivable measure of contrast will similarly divide the (L,R)-
space into two sub-regions, and thus predict its own locus of transition
between transparency and non-transparency.the other—test—side, observers adjust its luminance range
R to perform two diﬀerent tasks. In one task, they indicate
the highest luminance range for which the test side appears
transparent. In the other task, they indicate the lowest
luminance range for which the test side appears to be seen
in plain view (i.e., with no overlying transparency). The
mean of the settings across these two tasks provides an esti-
mate of the locus of switch in the percept of transparency.
3.2.1. Methods
Observers. Three experienced observers, with normal or
corrected-to-normal visual acuity, participated in the
experiment. Two of the observers were naı¨ve to the purpo-
ses of the experiment; the third was author MS (observer
O2).
Stimuli and apparatus. Stimuli were stereoscopic dis-
plays, each consisting of a 4.31 deg · 5.38 deg rectangular
frame containing one of three texture patterns. The texture
elements were given a far disparity of 16.5 min of arc rela-
tive to the rectangular frame, and half-occlusions were
introduced at its lateral edges (‘‘da Vinci stereopsis,’’
Nakayama & Shimojo, 1990). Texture elements adjacent
to the left edge of the frame were present in the right eyes
image only, and texture elements adjacent to the right edge
were present in the left eyes image only. This resulted in
the textured region being perceived as a frontoparallel sur-
face, lying in a depth plane behind that of the frame, and
seen through it.
The textured region in each eyes image was divided by a
vertical mid-line into two lateral halves that could be
assigned diﬀerent values of luminance range (Lmax  Lmin)
and mean luminance. This vertical contrast discontinuity
was given a near disparity of 9.9 min of arc relative to
the texture elements. Depending on the contrast relation-
ships across the two sides, the contrast discontinuity was
perceived as belonging to a transparent surface on either
the left or the right side—ﬂoating at the depth of the con-
trast discontinuity, in front of the textured background (see
the schematic depiction in Fig. 4).
The reference half of the display had a ﬁxed mean lumi-
nance of 39.6 cd/m2, and a ﬁxed luminance range of 45.3
cd/m2 (Michelson contrast = 0.57). The reference was
Fig. 8. Transparency displays showing the three texture patterns used in Experiment 1: sinusoidal gratings and two versions of random-dot textures.
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display. From trial to trial, the mean luminance of the
other, test, half of the display was clamped at one of 7 pos-
sible values: 24.8, 29.7, 34.7, 39.6, 44.6, 49.5, and 54.5 cd/
m2 (three darker than the reference, and three lighter).
The luminance range within the test side was to be adjusted
by the observers. On any given trial, the assignment of test
and reference was immediately apparent to the observers,
because only the luminance range within the test side was
under their control.
Three diﬀerent texture patterns were used: sinusoidal
gratings and two versions of random-dot textures. The
sinusoidal gratings had a period of 0.69 of visual angle,
and were oriented at 45 (left panel of Fig. 8). The ﬁrst ver-
sion of the random-dot texture had rectangular elements,
elongated in the horizontal direction (29.7 min · 9.9 min;
middle panel of Fig. 8). The presence of the contrast dis-
continuity generated polarity-preserving X-junctions in
each eyes image. The second version of random-dot tex-
ture had square dots, with sides measuring 9.9 min. The
presence of the contrast discontinuity introduced no
X-junctions in the monocular images for this texture (since
the dot size equaled the disparity given to the contrast dis-
continuity; see right panel of Fig. 8).
The stimuli were presented on a linearized Radius Press-
View 17SR monitor. The monitor was calibrated so that
screen luminance values (ranging from 0.58 to 90.14 cd/
m2) were linearly related to the 8-bit look-up table values.
The stimuli were viewed through a mirror stereoscope,
from an optical distance of 99 cm.
Procedure. Each observer participated in 6 experimental
sessions—one for each combination of the 2 experimental
tasks and 3 textured backgrounds. On each trial, the mean
luminance of the test side was randomly set to one of 7 pre-
determined values. Observers adjusted the luminance range
within the test side (which varied symmetrically about the
preset mean value) in order to perform one of two tasks.
In one—the ‘‘highest-transparent’’—task, the luminance
range within the test was initially set to a low value
(randomly drawn from the lower-most quarter of the
scale), and observers set the highest luminance range for
which the test side was perceived to contain an overlying
transparent surface. In the other—‘‘lowest not-transpar-ent’’—task, the luminance range within the test side was
initially set to a high value (randomly drawn from the
upper-most quarter of the scale), and observers set the low-
est luminance range for which the test side was perceived to
be in plain view, i.e., with no intervening transparent layer.
Within each session, observers performed 35 experimental
adjustments (5 adjustments for each of the 7 values of
mean luminance), preceded by 7 practice adjustments
(one for each value of mean luminance).
3.2.2. Results
The data for the three observers are plotted in Fig. 9A.
No systematic diﬀerences were obtained across the three
textured backgrounds; the data are thus shown averaged
across the three textures. Each data point in Fig. 9A thus
corresponds to the mean of 15 settings by an observer.
The lower data curve in each plot represents an observers
settings in the ‘‘highest-transparent’’ task—i.e., the highest
luminance range for which the observer perceived the
test side to be transparent. The upper curve represents
an observers settings in the ‘‘lowest-not-transparent’’
task—i.e., the lowest luminance range for which the
observer perceived the test side to not be transparent
(i.e., seen in plain view). The region in between thus cor-
responds to a transition zone, where neither side has a
clear preferential status in terms of a transparency per-
cept. An estimate of the locus of switch in the percept
of transparency may thus be obtained by taking the mean
of the settings in the two tasks. These estimated transition
loci for the 3 observers are displayed in the graphs in
Fig. 9B.
Two characteristics of these data are salient: First, the
data exhibit a systematic failure of Metellis magnitude
constraint in predicting a percept of transparency. As
shown in Fig. 7A, the magnitude constraint predicts that
the locus of transition between transparency and non-
transparency should be ﬂat—exhibiting no dependence
on mean luminance. This prediction is clearly not borne
out; rather observers settings exhibit a systematic
increase with the mean luminance on the test side. The
deviations from the predictions of the magnitude con-
straint are particularly large in the left half of each plot
(i.e., all points to the left of the reference point (L0,R0)).
A B
Fig. 9. Results of Experiment 1: (A) Observer settings of luminance range for the highest-transparent and the lowest-not-transparent tasks. The error bars
depict 95% conﬁdence intervals. (B) Estimated transition loci between transparency and non-transparency based on the average of the settings on the two
tasks. Observers settings consistently follow the Michelson-contrast constraint for darkening transparency (data points to the left of reference), but are
more variable for lightening transparency (data points to the right of reference).
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ent layers—when the test side has a lower mean lumi-
nance than the reference. In this regime, the test side
consistently fails to be perceived as transparent when
its Michelson contrast exceeds that of the reference
side—despite the fact that its luminance ranges is still
lower than that of the reference (thus satisfying Metellis
magnitude constraint).
Second, a marked asymmetry is evident between tests
that are darker than the reference (all points to the left
of (L0,R0)) and tests that are lighter than the reference
(all points to the right of (L0, R0)). When the test side
is darker than the reference, the settings of the three
observers agree closely with one another, and they closely
follow the Michelson-contrast prediction (recall Fig. 7B).
On the other hand, when the test side is lighter than the
reference, there is greater variability across observers:
Whereas observer O3s settings continue to follow the
Michelson-contrast prediction, the settings of observers
O1 and O2 are strongly biased toward the horizontaltransition locus predicted by Metellis magnitude con-
straint. (These biases are robust, and were obtained in
each individual experimental session for observers O1
and O2.)
In addition to the greater variability across observers,
there is also greater variability within each observers set-
tings in the regime where the test region is lighter than the
reference (lightening transparency). For each observer,
and for each of the two experimental tasks, setting vari-
ance was collapsed over the 3 test luminances that are
darker than the reference (‘‘darker variance,’’ s2d), and
similarly over the 3 test luminances that are lighter than
the reference (‘‘lighter variance,’’ s2l ). In 5 of the 6 cases
(3 observers · 2 experimental tasks), setting variability
was higher in the lighter-transparency condition than in
the darker-transparency condition; in the sixth case it
was almost identical. To test whether these diﬀerences
were statistically reliable, we performed a test of the alter-
native hypothesis that r2l > r
2
d, against the null that
r2l ¼ r2d, using the F statistic:

























Fig. 10. Reliability (1/variance) of observer settings plotted in the
darkening transparency cases versus the lightening transparency cases.
Most points lie above the identity function, thereby indicating that setting
reliability is greater when the test region is darker than the reference. Error
bars denote 95% conﬁdence intervals.




. ð5ÞThe tests revealed that the increase in setting variance in
the lighter-transparency condition was statistically signiﬁ-
cant (at the .05 level) for all 5 cases where s2l > s
2
d. (As
expected, the diﬀerence was not statistically signiﬁcant for
the sixth case.) Fig. 10 depicts this comparison in terms
of setting reliability (=1/variance)—a commonly used mea-
sure of the eﬀectiveness of a visual cue in determining a per-
ceptual estimate (e.g. Backus & Banks, 1999; Ernst &
Bu¨lthoﬀ, 2004; Maloney, 2002). (See Fulvio, Singh, &
Maloney, 2005, for a similar analysis in investigating ach-
romatic and chromatic contributions to perceptual trans-
parency.) Observers settings are consistently more
reliable in the darkening-transparency condition than in
the lightening-transparency condition: most points in
Fig. 10 lie above the oblique line depicting the identity
function.
3.2.3. Discussion
Experiment 1 reveals two basic results. First, the percep-
tual construction of transparency is not predicted by Metel-
lis magnitude constraint. Rather, the perceptual transition
between transparency and non-transparency is better
approximated by the Michelson-contrast constraint. Sec-
ond, there is a marked asymmetry between transparent lay-
ers that darken versus lighten the underlying surface. In
particular, settings in the two tasks (highest-transparent
and lowest-not-transparent) were both more consistentacross observers, as well as more reliable within individual
observers, in the darkening-transparency case. Thus the
perceptual transition between transparency and non-trans-
parency is sharply deﬁned for darkening transparency,
but rather imprecise and ill-deﬁned for lightening transpar-
ency. This asymmetry in precision is consistent with observ-
ers reports that there was a wide range of settings in the
lighter-ﬁlter conditions for which the percept of transparen-
cy (i.e., whether the left or right sidewas transparent) was rel-
atively ambiguous.
Even thoughMichelson contrast does a considerably bet-
ter job of explaining observers settings thanMetellismagni-
tude constraint, it does not entirely capture the transition
between transparency and non-transparency—at least for
cases involving lightening transparency.Whereas it perfectly
predicts the transition loci for all observers in the regime of
darkening transparency, in the regime of lightening trans-
parency, two of the three observers exhibited large devia-
tions from the Michelson-constrast constraint. Speciﬁcally,
their settings were systematically biased toward the lumi-
nance-range prediction—the horizontal prediction that fol-
lows from Metellis magnitude constraint; recall Fig. 7A.
A natural question is whether these deviations from
Michelson contrast can be attributed to the way in which
observers scale perceived contrast in the textures used. For
the more complex textures used in Robilotto et al.s (2002)
study, for instance, neitherMichelson contrast nor any other
standard contrast measure could capture observers per-
ceived contrast; however their apparent contrast neverthe-
less predicted the perceived transmittance of transparent
ﬁlters. Similarly, in the current context, it may be the case
that perceived-contrast constraint C4 perfectly captures
observers percept of transparency, but that perceived con-
trast is simply not determined byMichelson contrast. Exper-
iment 2 investigates this possibility by obtaining contrast
matches on the textures used in Experiment 1.
3.3. Experiment 2
Experiment 2 measures how observers scale perceived
contrast in the textures used in Experiment 1. We use dis-
play conﬁgurations similar to Experiment 1, but with the
test and reference halves separated laterally, so the displays
no longer generate the percept of transparency (see
Fig. 11). Observers adjust the luminance range within the
test texture patch in order to match the apparent contrast
of the reference texture patch.
3.3.1. Methods
Observers. The same three observers participated as in
Experiment 1.
Stimuli. The stimuli diﬀered from those used Experiment
1 in only two ways. First, the two (test and reference) halves
of each transparency display were laterally separated (see
Fig. 11). Second, the displays contained no disparity infor-
mation. Both manipulations were designed to suppress the
percept of transparency. The same set of photometric values
Fig. 11. Stimulus conﬁguration used for contrast matching in Experiment
2. The mean luminance of the test patch (the one on the right in this
display) was clamped to diﬀerent values, and observers adjusted the
luminance range within it in order to match the apparent contrast of the
reference patch. This experiment used the same three texture patterns as in
Experiment 1 (see Fig. 8).
Fig. 12. Results of Experiment 2. Observers contrast matches on the
textures used in Experiment 1 follow the Michelson-contrast prediction,
given by the oblique dashed line. (The error bars denote 95% conﬁdence
intervals.) Hence the deviations from the Michelson-contrast constraint
observed in Experiment 1 (Fig. 9) cannot be attributed to the way in which
the observers scale apparent contrast in the textures used.
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erence patches.
Procedure. Each observer participated in 3 sessions—one
for each of the 3 textures. On each trial, the test patch was
randomly set to one of the 7 values of mean luminance.
Observers adjusted the luminance rangewithin the test patch
in order to match the perceived contrast of the reference.
Within each session, observers performed 35 experimental
adjustments (5 adjustments for each of the 7 values of mean
luminance), preceded by 7 practice adjustments.
3.3.2. Results
The data for the three observers are plotted in Fig. 12.
As in Experiment 1, no systematic diﬀerences were
obtained across the three textures, and the data are shown
averaged over them. Each data point thus corresponds to
the mean of 15 adjustments for an observer.
Unlike the transparency settings for the lightening ﬁl-
ters is Experiment 1 (recall Fig. 9), the contrast data exhibit
a high degree of consistency across observers. In particular,
the data curves consistently follow the oblique prediction
based on Michelson contrast—thereby indicating that for
the texture patterns used, observers matches of perceived
contrast are well-captured by Michelson contrast. Conse-
quently, the deviations obtained in Experiment 1 from
the Michelson-contrast prediction—in two of the three
observers, in the case of lightening ﬁlters—cannot be
attributed to how the observers scale perceived contrast
in these displays. Indeed, these results show that the trans-
parency setting deviate systematically from perceived con-
trast. Thus the deviations obtained in Experiment 1
appear to be speciﬁc to the context of perceptual
transparency.66 Observer O2s contrast matches exhibit a small deviation from the
Michelson-contrast prediction; however this deviation is in the opposite
direction, relative to the large deviation obtained in the transparency
settings in Experiment 1; see Fig. 9B.4. General discussion
4.1. Patten of bias
The results of Experiment 1 demonstrate that Metellis
magnitude constraint fails to predict the perception of
transparency. Speciﬁcally, the locus of transition between
transparency and non-transparency (measured in terms of
luminance range, Lmax  Lmin) increases systematically
with the mean luminance on the test side—whereas the
magnitude constraint predicts that it should be constant.
This transition locus is better captured by the Michelson
contrast on the test side, relative to the reference. These
results thus roughly parallel previous results on matching
the material properties of transparent surfaces, where the
perceived transmittance of a transparent surface was found
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given instead by the Michelson contrast (Singh & Ander-
son, 2002) or perceived contrast (Robilotto et al., 2002)
in the region of transparency.
However, the results of Experiment 1 also exhibited
deviations from the Michelson-contrast prediction. Specif-
ically, in the regime of lightening transparency (i.e., when
the test has higher mean luminance than the reference),
two of the three observers exhibited a shift toward the
luminance-range prediction (Fig. 9). These deviations are
surprising, given that they constitute deviations from per-
ceived contrast as well. (As the results of Experiment 2
showed, perceived contrast in the textures used here coin-
cides with Michelson contrast.)
What might be the source of these deviations, in the
regime of lightening transparency?Onepossibility is suggest-
ed by considering the derivation of the two constraints C2
and C3. Recall that the luminance-range constraint C2:
p  q 6 a  b was derived from the restriction a 6 1 on the
solution for a (Gerbino et al., 1990; Metelli, 1974), whereas
theMichelson-contrast constraintC3 : pqpþq 6 abaþbwas derived
from the additional restriction tP 0 on the solution for t
(Singh & Anderson, 2002). Because these two restrictions
(a 6 1 and tP 0) apply simultaneously, however, it follows
that both constraints C2 and C3 must be satisﬁed together.
The two plots on the left of Fig. 13 display the respective
subsets of the (L,R)-space where constraints C2 and C3 are
satisﬁed individually (recall Fig. 7). Thus the region of
(L,R)-space where C2 and C3 are satisﬁed simultaneously
is given by the intersection of these two prediction subsets.
This intersection-of-constraints prediction is plotted on the
right-hand side of Fig. 13. As is evident from this graph,
the intersection hypothesis does indeed predict an asymme-
try between darkening and lightening transparency. For
darkening transparency, the locus of transition from trans-
parency to non-transparency is predicted to be given byFig. 13. Predictions of transparency based on the intersection of the two
constraints shown in Fig. 7. The left side depicts the respective subsets of
(L,R)-space that are predicted to generate a percept of transparency
according to Metellis magnitude constraint (top) and the Michelson-
contrast constraint (bottom). However, because these two constraints
must be satisﬁed simultaneously, the percept of transparency is predicted
by the intersection of these two subsets, as shown on the right.Michelson contrast; whereas for lightening transparent lay-
ers, the transition locus is predicted to be given by lumi-
nance range. Thus the combined operation of the two
constraints C2 and C3 predicts the ‘‘ﬂattening’’ of the data
curves observed in 2 of 3 three observers.
4.2. Asymmetry in setting variability
In addition to the asymmetry in bias, a large asymmetry
between darkening and lightening ﬁlters was also observed
with respect to setting variability. For darkening ﬁlters, set-
tings were highly consistent across observers, as well as
highly reliable within individual observers. For lightening
ﬁlters, on the other hand, there was considerably greater
variability both across observers, as well as within individ-
ual observers settings. Thus, whereas the perceptual tran-
sition between transparency and non-transparency is
sharply deﬁned for darkening transparency, it is substan-
tially more imprecise and ill-deﬁned for lightening trans-
parency. Although the intersection-of-constraints
hypothesis considered above explains the pattern of bias
seen in observers settings, it does not make any speciﬁc
prediction concerning setting reliability.
A natural hypothesis to consider is whether the light/
dark asymmetry in variability is simply the result of
Webers law. After all, the test mean luminance is, by def-
inition, higher for lightening transparency than darkening
transparency. In order to test this hypothesis, we compared
the pattern of increase in variance across the transparency
experiment (Experiment 1) and the contrast experiment
(Experiment 2). If the light/dark asymmetry observed in
the transparency experiment were simply the result of
Webers law, one would predict a similar light/dark asym-
metry in the contrast experiment as well. When F tests
comparing the variances in the lighter versus darker test
patches were performed for the contrast settings in Exper-
iment 2, none of the observers exhibited a signiﬁcantly
higher variance for the lighter reference patches (although
there was a trend in that direction). This diﬀers markedly
from the results of Experiment 1, where 5 of the 6 tests per-
formed revealed a statistically reliable increase in variance
in the lighter-transparency condition (see Fig. 11). Because
the set of values of mean luminance and contrast used in
the two experiments were identical, this diﬀerence indicates
that the large light/dark asymmetry observed in Experi-
ment 1 is speciﬁc to the context of transparency.
Visually comparing the plots of standard deviations
against mean luminance in the contrast settings versus
transparency settings also suggests the same conclusion
(see Fig. 14). In the contrast settings, there was little evi-
dence for a systematic increase in standard deviation, except
at the very highest value of mean luminance. In the ‘‘high-
est-transparent’’ task of Experiment 1, by contrast, stan-
dard-deviations remained essentially constant within the
darker-transarency regime; then they increased suddenly
as the mean-luminance values enter the lightening-transpar-
ency regime. This diﬀerential pattern of increase again indi-
















































Fig. 14. A comparison of the increase in standard deviations of observers settings in the highest-transparent task in Experiment 1 (left), and the contrast-
matching task in Experiment 2 (right). This comparison suggests that the light/dark asymmetry obtained in Experiment 1 is not simply the result of a
Weber-like behavior.
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matches cannot be reduced to Webers law.
4.3. Darkening as a separate cue
One way to understand these dark/light asymmetries is in
terms of the statistics of natural images (see, e.g., Brunswik&
Kamiya, 1953; Elder & Goldberg, 2002; Geisler, Perry,
Super, & Gallogly, 2001, for the role of statistics of natural
images in understanding visual processing). A ubiquitous
feature of the natural environment is the presence of shad-
ows. Although shadows are not material layers, they share
a number of photometric properties with transparency.
From a generative point of view, their presence preserves
contrast polarity along underlying contrast borders, and
their photometric inﬂuence is in fact consistent with that of
a neutral-density ﬁlter, or a veil of zero reﬂectance.7 From
a perceptual point of view, shadows also involve computing
multiple photometric causes by decomposing image lumi-
nance. The sheer frequency and ubiquity of shadows in the
natural environment, and the critical need for visual organ-
isms to interpret them correctly, has led many researchers
to posit that general mechanisms of luminance decomposi-
tion (such as those responsible for the perception of trans-
parency) evolved from visual mechanisms for computing
shadows (Noest & van den Berg, 1993; Stoner & Albright,
1996; see also von Helmholtz, 1860/1924).
If visual mechanisms of luminance decomposition are
indeed tuned to shadows, this would suggest the existence
of asymmetries in how the visual system interprets shadows
versus spotlights. Such asymmetries have indeed been dem-
onstrated. The bottom display in Fig. 15 can be generated
by two very diﬀerent physical setups: a light-colored surface
with a shadow covering its left half, or a dark-colored surface
with a spotlight shining on its right half. Using backgrounds7 To a ﬁrst-order approximation, the photometric transformation
introduced by a shadow is given by P = aA, which is seen to be a special
instance of Metellis equation with T = 0. Thus shadows can only darken
underlying surfaces, whereas the presence of a potentially non-zero term T
in transparency means that a transparent surface can either darken,
lighten, or preserve the underlying luminance.such as these, Gilchrist and Zdravkovic (2002) found that
when observers are shown a dark-colored surface, half of
which is illuminated with a spotlight, they perceive it instead
as a light-colored surface, half covered by a shadow. Based
on these results, Gilchrist and Zdravkovic (2002) posited
that, in addition to anchoring the highest luminance towhite,
the visual systemalso uses the highest luminance in the image
to deﬁne the default illumination level of the scene (see also
Kozaki, 1973). Thus the brighter half of the display is per-
ceived as a light-colored surface under default illumination,
rather than a dark surface under spotlight.
From the point of view of the current article, Gilchrist
and Zdravkovics result also speaks to the light/dark asym-
metry observed in our own data. Indeed, there are two
ways in which the light/dark asymmetry observed in light-
ness perception may bear on the current results. Although
the two are related, and each is capable of providing insight
into the light/dark asymmetry observed in our transparen-
cy data, they embody diﬀerent assumptions concerning the
nature of the underlying representations in lightness per-
ception and their relationship to transparency. We describe
each in turn.
One interpretation of the light/dark asymmetry is that the
visual system treats darkening as a cue to luminance decom-
position, or scission. In this analysis, the concept of ‘‘default
illumination’’ in lightness perception is identiﬁed with per-
ceiving a surface ‘‘in plain view’’ in transparency. From this
perspective, when viewing the bottom display in Fig. 15, the
darker half is represented as light-colored surface + shadow,
whereas the lighter patches on the right are perceived in plain
view and as continuing ‘‘underneath’’ the shadow. Thus,
unlike traditional intrinsic-image models which assert that
all image regions are decomposed into illumination and
reﬂectance maps (e.g. Barrow & Tenenbaum, 1978), this
view asserts that only shadowed (or lower-illumination)
regions are explicitly decomposed into these two sources.
The regions in the default (highest) illumination are per-
ceived in ‘‘plain view,’’ in the sense that the lightness of sur-
faces under the default illumination are determined via some
kind of anchoring and normalization principles that inter-
pret the highest luminance as white (e.g. Gilchrist et al.,
1999). Note that this view embodies a hybridmodel of light-
Light background
+ shadow + spotlight
Dark background
Fig. 15. Demonstrating the perceptual asymmetry in the interpretation of shadows versus spotlights. When the display at the bottom is generated by
shining a spotlight on the right half of a dark-colored background, observers perceive it instead as a light-colored background, whose left half is covered by
a shadow (after Gilchrist and Zdravkovic, 2002).
8 In the context of transparency, it is evident that representing a surface
in plain view as two layers in depth—the surface plus an overlying
transparent layer that happens to have full transmittance (and does not
contribute to image luminance)—would constitute an uneconomical
representation, and a waste of cortical resources. A more parsimonious
approach is to have a single-layer representation be the default (i.e.,
corresponding to image regions interpreted as seen in plain view—which
generally constitute a large proportion of the image), and generate a multi-
layered representation only in those regions that deviate from this default
‘‘atmosphere.’’
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tation of shadows, but relying on anchoring and normaliza-
tion principles to determine the perceived lightness of
surfaces in the default (or highest) illumination.
An alternative, but related, interpretation of the light/
dark asymmetry focuses on the role of border ownership
of illumination boundaries. The fact that observers treat
the illumination boundary as arising from a shadow rather
than a spotlight can be re-expressed as a statement about
the interpreted ‘‘ownership’’ of illumination boundaries
(such as the central graded contrast border in the bottom
display in Fig. 15). Indeed, another way of stating Gilchrist
and Zdravkovic (2002) result is that observers treat the illu-
mination boundary as arising from a cast shadow, not a
spotlight—i.e., from the presence of an object that has
interrupted the default illumination. From this perspective,
polarity-preserving darkening of surfaces and contours
provides evidence for the presence of a cast shadow, and
hence, serves as a cue to the border ownership of the con-
trast border. Note that in our experiments, the central
dividing border was presented in stereoscopic depth, and
observers made settings in the highest-transparent and low-
est-not-transparent tasks. It is possible that observers
based their settings simply on which side appeared to
‘‘own’’ the contour ﬂoating in depth.
Thus there are two interpretations of Gilchrist and
Zdravkovics result that may provide some understanding
of the light/dark asymmetry observed in our experiments.
According to the luminance-decomposition version of the
hypothesis, only one side of the contour (the one treated
as a perturbation from the default atmosphere) is explicitly
given a layered representation; the other side (containing
the default atmosphere) is represented as a single layer.
Although this is a reasonable and eﬃcient strategy for bio-logical vision, it deviates from traditional models of intrin-
sic-image analysis (e.g. Barrow & Tenenbaum, 1978).8 The
border-ownership version of the hypothesis, on the other
hand, is neutral with respect to whether or not a layered
representation is generated at every point in the image, or
only for perturbations from the default atmosphere. It
asserts simply that the contrast border is more likely to
be owned by the darker side—making no claims concern-
ing the side that does not own the contrast border. Deter-
mining which of the two versions is ultimately more
appropriate will require further empirical tests aimed spe-
ciﬁcally at distinguishing them.
From the perspective of the current paper, however, the
important point is that the dark/light asymmetries
observed in the context of spotlights and shadows, and
the statistics of natural images, both suggest that the visual
system may use polarity-preserving darkening as a cue to
transparency. Indeed, treating darkening as an additional
cue to transparency perfectly accounts for the light/dark
asymmetries seen in our data—both in setting bias and in
setting reliability (Experiment 1). When the test mean lumi-
nance is lower than the reference, the darkening cue on the
test side is always consistent with transparency, and the
locus of transition between transparency and non-transpar-
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(=Michelson contrast for the textures used). This transi-
tion locus is sharply deﬁned (setting reliability is high)
because as soon as the test contrast goes below the refer-
ence contrast, the contrast and luminance cues both
become consistent with perceptual transparency—thereby
combining to yield a powerful signal for transparency.
On the other hand, when the test mean luminance is higher
than the reference, the darkening cue becomes inconsistent
with transparency. Thus, in order to overcome the incon-
sistent signal from the darkening cue, observers must
increase the strength of the contrast cue by setting the test
contrast substantially lower than the reference contrast.
(This was the case for two of our three observers.) More-
over, in the lightening-transparency case, varying the con-
trast on the test side can only manipulate the cues from (a)
neither cue being consistent with transparency (when the
test contrast exceeds the reference contrast) to (b) a situa-
tion involving cue conﬂict (when the test contrast is lower
than the reference). As a result, the locus of transition
between transparency and non-transparency is more
imprecise and ill-deﬁned (lower setting reliability within
observers, and lower consistency across observers).
In sum, our data is well explained by treating darkening
as a separate cue to transparency that interacts with the
contrast-reduction cue to transparency. This cue may work
either by introducing a border-ownership bias, or by intro-
ducing an additional cue to luminance scission. Although
further research is needed to fully resolve how this addi-
tional cue is instantiated, the important point is that treat-
ing darkening as a separate cue to transparency provides a
coherent account of the pattern of results obtained in our
experiment—both in terms of the pattern in bias and the
asymmetry in setting variability.
5. Conclusions
In measuring the locus of perceptual transition
between transparency and non-transparency, we found
a failure Metellis magnitude constraint. The locus of
transition was approximated instead by a constraint
based on Michelson contrast (=perceived contrast in
the textures used). In addition, however, settings also
revealed a pronounced asymmetry between darkening
and lightening transparency, both in terms of bias and
reliability. For darkening transparency, the estimated
transition locus closely and consistently followed the pre-
diction of perceived contrast, with high setting reliability.
For lightening transparency, however, the settings were
more variable across observers (with two of the observers
exhibiting deviations from the prediction of perceived
contrast), as well as less reliable within observers. These
asymmetries in bias and reliability can both be under-
stood in terms of an interaction between the lowering-
contrast cue to transparency, and a proposed darkening
cue to transparency. Independently measuring the
strength of the darkening cue, and investigating its inter-actions with other cues to perceptual transparency,
remains an important topic for future research.
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